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Abstract
This paper explores how terrorism alters human capital investment by affecting ex-
pectations. Using different estimators, we identify a negative causal effect of terrorism
on Kenyan primary school enrolment and attendance. Among these, we exploit al-
Shabaab’s revenue streams and position in the al-Qaeda network to predict attacks.
To isolate the significant contribution of indirect mechanisms—like expectations—we
use finely geo-coded data on children and their closest schools as well as border disconti-
nuities in educational provision, combined with media and attitudinal data. Moreover,
we evaluate the degree and effect of the discrepancy between objective and subjective
expectations in a structural model.
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1 Introduction
Among respondents surveyed in Europe and North America, 58 percent are a “good deal”
or “very much worried” about terrorist attacks, on par with concerns about job loss or war
(World Value Survey, 2010-2013). In Africa, the share is 74 percent. These fears seem at odds
with the observed risks of dying in terrorist attacks in both regions, 9.2 · 10−5 percent and
9.6·10−4 percent respectively.1 However well founded concerns may be, they can nevertheless
affect decisions regarding the future, including investments in human capital.
In this paper, we examine the impact of terrorist attacks on primary school enrolment
and attendance. Specifically, we highlight the importance of expectations as a mechanism
through which terrorism affects behaviour. Different from many other types of violence, such
as gun crime or civil war, the explicit purpose of terrorism is the spread of fear and disruption
beyond the violent act itself (see Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; for a detailed discussion).
As a consequence of this strategy, terrorism can impact on educational outcomes in two
ways. Like other types of violence, terrorist attacks can affect educational outcomes directly
by destroying infrastructure and killing school personnel. However, because intimidation
is the motive behind many terrorist attacks, they are likely to affect educational choices
also indirectly by changing expectations regarding the future; even for individuals physically
unaffected by attacks.
We investigate this in the Kenyan setting, which lends itself to a causal analysis, as parts
of the country have seen a stark increase in terrorist activity from the late 2000s onwards.
The vast majority of attacks are carried out by al-Shabaab, an Islamist terror organisation
based in Somalia with links to al-Qaeda. We explore the importance of expectations and the
mechanisms at play by exploiting the fact that many attacks do not occur on children’s way to
school or even in the administrative area they reside in. To further investigate the importance
of terrorism’s salience we draw on data on media coverage of attacks and individual attitudes
to violence. Moreover, we estimate a behavioural model of activity choices for children in
the presence of terrorist attacks. This allows us to evaluate the importance of different
mechanisms, and to obtain an estimate for the discrepancy between objective mortality risk
and the subjective risk perceived by agents.
Before turning our attention to the role of expectations, fears and attitudes, we establish
a causal effect of terrorism on school enrolment, applying a range of estimators to several
independent data sources. In a first instance, we use the unique concentration of attacks in
spacetime to estimate various difference-in-differences specifications. Estimates using Demo-
1The percentages reported are the annual risk of dying from terrorist attacks in 2015. Numbers for
terrorist fatalities are drawn from the Global Terror Database (own calculations). Population numbers are
drawn from UN data, see https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/, accessed January 2019.
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graphic Health Survey (DHS) data suggest that counties continuously exposed to terrorist
attacks experience a decrease in enrolment of around 15 percentage points, corresponding
to circa 25 percent. Each attack is found to decrease enrolment by 0.9 percentage points.
We do not find significant gender differences in the parameter estimates. Estimates using
enrolment data digitised from reports by the ministry of education suggest that each attack
keeps 243 children out of school.
A potential identification challenge is that terrorists select when and where to attack. We
cannot reject parallel trends during the early 2000s (before the sharp increase in terrorist
activity). Nevertheless, we exploit three features unique to the Kenyan setting to obtain
plausibly exogenous variation in al-Shabaab attacks. First, we use al-Shabaab’s position
within the al-Qaeda network. Al-Shabaab has particularly strong links to the Yemeni branch
of al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), from which it receives support and
guidance. We document not only that al-Shabaab closely follows AQAP in its timing of
attacks, but also that it chooses similar targets for its attacks. Second, we exploit the fact
that revenue streams for al-Qaeda derived from Yemen’s exports of hydrocarbons increase
the intensity of attacks by both AQAP and al-Shabaab. Finally, we look at al-Shabaab’s
main source of income directly: the export of charcoal. A major trading partner for Somalia’s
coal are the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and we use coal imports by the UAE as a third
exogenous variation. Estimates obtained from IV and OLS are of similar magnitude and we
cannot reject the validity of the instruments.
We corroborate our results by zooming into two of the counties hardest hit by terrorist
attacks. Using longitudinal household data collected as part of the Hunger Safety Net
Programme (HSNP), we find that geographically close attacks reduce school attendance of
primary school aged children even conditional on household fixed effects. We also compare
the effect of terrorism with other types of violence, and find no influence of incidences of
violence unrelated to terrorism, such as protests, riots or general violence.
Since the causal reduced form estimates capture both direct physical effects, and indirect
effects of terrorism that operate via agents’ expectations, we provide three pieces of evidence
all pointing towards a crucial role of the latter. First, we use the exact geographic coordinates
of individuals, schools and attacks and juxtapose two types of attacks: attacks close to
children’s residences or on their way to school on the one hand, and attacks further away
(but still in the same county) on the other. The relative importance of direct and indirect
pathways differs for the two, with attacks not in the immediate vicinity unlikely to affect
behaviour through physical damage. Although the effect of attacks in proximity to schools
or residences is considerably larger, attacks occurring elsewhere retain a significant effect. To
fully rule out a direct effect through damage to Kenyan infrastructure or personnel, we use
3
the fact that the responsibility and provision of education vary discretely at administrative
borders. We find that even attacks on Somali soil that are geographically close have a strong
and significant effect on school enrolment of Kenyan children in the border region, controlling
for attacks in a child’s Kenyan county of residence.
Second, we examine the influence of two factors that—by themselves—do not affect in-
frastructure or personnel directly: threats made by terrorist organisations andmedia coverage
of terrorist attacks. The correlations with enrolment are large and significant for both, again
conditional on the incidence of actual attacks carried out in any given county. Moreover, we
find that terrorist threats and media coverage of terrorist attacks regarding Somalia impact
negatively on educational enrolment in Kenyan counties adjacent to the Somali border. Fi-
nally, we investigate attitudes directly. Using self-reported data from the Afrobarometer we
find no effect of terrorist attacks on self-reported experiences of violence but large effects on
concerns about violence.
Based on these insights about the importance of expectations, we formulate a simple
structural model of activity choices for children. Indirect effects include on the one hand
a change in agents’ risk assessment about leaving the home to either work or go to school.
On the other hand, terrorism may decrease the future returns to education by, for instance,
eroding institutions. In the model, we distinguish these two mechanisms. We estimate
the model’s structural parameters, which lets us evaluate the relative importance of different
channels, and to obtain an estimate for parents’ perceived risk of children becoming casualties
of a terrorist attack. Contrasting this to the objective probability, we further can use the
model to assess the reduction in school attendance that is due to the misperception itself.
We employ moments constructed from the HSNP data, and maintain a close link with the
reduced form estimation by exploiting the quasi-experimental variation in attacks also for
identification in the structural estimation. Comparing the perceived probability of dying with
the actual number of deaths, our results suggests that parents over-estimate this probability
by a factor of 7.5, in line with studies documenting individuals’ over-estimation of mortality
risk in various contexts (see e.g. Fischhoff et al., 2000; Delavande et al., 2017). Finally, we
use the model to obtain an estimate of the individual-level cost of terrorism, which we find
to amount to 1.6 times the average annual earnings of an adult without any schooling.
Our paper complements the literature on the consequences of violence by documenting
the importance of non-physical aspects as a mechanism through which behaviour is affected.
Several studies estimate either the total reduced form impact of violence (e.g. Justino et al.,
2013; Khan and Seltzer, 2016; Singh and Shemyakina, 2016; Koppensteiner and Menezes,
2018; Bertoni et al., 2018; Bru¨ck et al., forthcoming) or explicitly model the physical im-
pacts such as destruction of infrastructure (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014) or the effect on education
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personnel (Monteiro and Rocha, 2017). A separate body of work, in turn, analyses the im-
portance of subjective expectations for educational decisions (Dominitz and Manski, 1996;
Jensen, 2010; Giustinelli and Pavoni, 2017; Boneva and Rauh, 2018; Attanasio et al., 2019;
Delavande and Zafar, forthcoming; see Hartog and Diaz-Serrano, 2014, and Giustinelli and
Manski, 2018, for overviews). We draw on insights from both of these literatures and pro-
vide evidence that terrorism affects behaviour also by changing expectations. In addition,
by integrating the reduced form evidence in a structurally estimated behavioural model, we
can quantify the discrepancy between objective and subjective risk from terrorist attacks,
and evaluate its impact on education choices. A recent paper by Shany (2018) emphasizes
the negative effect of psychological distress on exam results of Israeli high school graduates
during the Second Intifada. Our paper instead focuses on enrolment as a human capital in-
vestment decision that we find to respond to the salience of attacks—for instance by drawing
on media data. As such, the mechanism we investigate is closer to the work by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003, 2008), who document large negative effects of terrorism on economic
growth via a reduction in foreign direct investment, showing that terrorism can have severe
economic costs despite a limited direct physical impact.
This paper also contributes to the knowledge base on the workings of terrorist networks.
Part of our strategy to identify the causal effect of terrorist attacks exploits al-Shabaab’s
revenues and its position within the al-Qaeda network. The descriptive analysis leading to
our first stage thus provides novel empirical evidence on the strong correlation between at-
tacks by al-Shabaab on the one hand, and its revenues and attacks carried out by AQAP on
the other. The workings of terrorist organisations have already been documented in quali-
tative analyses (see Zimmermann, 2013; for instance). We provide a quantitative analysis of
these links. As such, the paper contributes on the growing literature on the determinants of
violence, like economic conditions (Miguel et al., 2004), colonial history (Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou, 2016) and ethnic composition (Amodio and Chiovelli, 2017), commodity prices
(Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2010; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Berman
et al., 2017; Ciccone, 2018) and donations (Limodio, 2018), social insurance (Fetzer, 2014)
and unobserved coalitions between factions (Trebbi and Weese, forthcoming).
After first describing the context and data sources used, we estimate in Section 3 the
causal effect of terrorist attacks on school enrolment. In Section 4, we bring additional data
to the analysis to investigate the mechanisms driving the estimated reduced form effects.
Finally, Section 5 presents the structurally estimated behavioural model together with its
estimates and counterfactual analysis.
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2 Background and data
The setting for our analysis is Kenya, which experienced a sharp increase in terrorist activity.
The majority of attacks were carried out from 2010 onwards by al-Shabaab in Kenya’s
northeastern region, bordering Somalia.
2.1 Terrorism in Kenya
Information on terrorist attacks is drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The
GTD defines a terrorist attack as the use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.2
For each incident in the data, the GTD collects information on, among other things, the
geographic coordinate of the incident’s location, the target, number of casualties and injuries,
the weapons used and the group responsible.
The vast majority of terrorist attacks in Kenya are carried out by al-Shabaab, an Islamist
terror organisation based in Somalia with the aim of overthrowing governments in the Horn
of Africa region and to install Islamic rule. The organisation traces its origins back to the
early 2000s, when radical young Islamists merged with a group of sharia courts, the Islamic
Courts Union, to serve as a youth milita. During the last two decades, al-Shabaab has been
present in large parts of Somalia.3
Al-Shabaab is an affiliate of al-Qaeda with particularly strong ties to al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Qaeda operates in a network structure with al-Qaeda core,
led directly by the “emir”, at its centre along with sets of affiliates. Closest to the core
are the regional affiliates, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Next, are affiliates, which are organisations subscribing
to al-Qaeda’s ideology and influence. These are officially recognised by al-Qaeda core, have
pledged allegiance to the “emir”, and al-Shabaab is one of them. Furthest away are associates
that have not been publicly recognised as al-Qaeda but are close in terms of ideology. These
include, for instance, Boko Haram in Nigeria or the so-called Movement for Tawhid and
Jihad in West Africa. See Zimmermann (2013) for a detailed description of the al-Qaeda
network.
Figure 1 shows the geographical and temporal distributions of terrorist attacks carried
out by al-Shabaab from the early 2000s onwards. The vast majority occur in Mogadishu and
in the southwest of Somalia. A smaller number are carried out in other countries, mainly
Kenya, but also Uganda. Attacks increase sharply from the late 2000s onwards.
2The data are available under https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/.
3See for instance Anderson and McKnight (2015) for an overview.
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Figure 1: Attacks of al-Shabaab
(a) Casualties of al-Shabaab attacks
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(b) Al-Shabaab attacks over time
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Notes: The figure reports total number of casualties and attacks by al-Shabaab during the years 2001-2014;
radii indicate number of casualties per attack; Source: Global Terrorism Database; own calculations.
Between the years 2001 and 2014, Kenya experienced 367 terrorist attacks (see panel
A of table 1). Figure 2a reports the geographical distribution terrorist attacks in Kenya.
Most attacks are concentrated in the three northeastern counties of Kenya, which border
Somalia.4 The two largest towns, Nairobi and Mombasa also experience considerable number
of attacks. Figure 2b shows the temporal variation in terrorist attacks. Between the years
2001 and 2007, Kenya experienced relatively few attacks. From then onwards, the intensity
increases sharply, reaching 82 attacks in 2014. The maps in Appendix B further show the
geographical distribution of attacks over time for the years 2010 to 2014.
In contrast to Boko Haram in Nigeria and favourable to our purposes, al-Shabaab barely
targets educational institutions (see panel B of table 1). The most common targets for al-
Shabaab are the police (96 attacks), citizens (74 attacks), businesses (53 attacks) and the
military (22 attacks). Between 2001 and 2014, educational institutions were targeted only 5
times, corresponding to 1.4 percent of all attacks.
In fact, al-Shabaab attacks are only a relatively small proportion of violent incidences
occurring in Kenya. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) reports that al-
Shabaab attacked 215 times between 2001 and 2014. Over the same time period there were
3,759 other types of violent events.
4These are Mandera, Wajir and Garissa.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Terrorist attacks in Kenya 2001-2014
Organisation All al- un- other
Shabaab known
Attacks 367 216 122 29
Casualties 931 523 313 95
Panel B: Terrorist attacks in Kenya 2001-2014 by target (source: GTD)
Target All Police Citizens Business Military Education Other
Attacks 367 96 74 53 22 5 117
Panel C: Characteristics of individuals in Kenya
Data source DHS DHS DHS HSNP
Sample All North- Mandera Mandera
east & Wajir & Wajir
Year 2009 2009 2009 2010
Children (6-14) currently at school 93.1 60.2 56.9 55.3
Girls (6-14) currently at school 93.4 55.7 50.7 46.7
Boys (6-14) currently at school 92.9 64.0 62.0 62.4
Adults (18+) ever in school 84.7 23.7 19.7 18.9
Women (18+) ever in school 79.3 11.7 8.4 7.6
Men (18+) ever in school 90.8 37.5 32.7 29.1
Members per household 4.3 5.4 5.7 7.0
Notes: Panel A: reports the total number and casualties of terrorist attacks by organisation in Kenya
occurring 2001 to 2014; Source: Global Terrorism Database; own calculations. Panel B: reports the total
number of terrorist attacks by target of attack in Kenya occurring 2001 to 2014; Source: Global Terrorism
Database; own calculations. Panel C: reports characteristics of respondents; column 1 is drawn from the 2009
DHS for the whole of Kenya; column 2 is drawn from the 2009 DHS for the northeast of Kenya (Mandera,
Wajir and Garissa) only; column 3 is drawn from the 2009 DHS for counties Mandera and Wajir only; column
4 is drawn from the 2010 HSNP Baseline survey for counties Mandera and Wajir.
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Figure 2: Terrorist attacks in Kenya
(a) Casualties of terrorist attacks in Kenya (b) Terrorist attacks over time in Kenya
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Notes: The figure reports total number of casualties and attacks in Kenya by perpetrator during the
years 2001-2014; radii indicate number of casualties per attack; Source: Global Terrorism Database; own
calculations.
2.2 Education in Kenya and summary statistics
Data on education in Kenya: We measure school enrolment in three different ways using
three distinct and independent data sources. First, we employ two rounds of the Kenyan
Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), 2009 and 2014, two nationally representative surveys of
Kenyan households.5 The 2009 and 2014 rounds of the Kenyan DHS interviewed all members
of 9,057 and 36,430 households, respectively (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2009,
2014). In addition to many other subjects, the questionnaires collect extensive information
on educational enrolment and years spent in school.
We complement these data with official information on the total number of children
enrolled in primary school for each county from the Kenyan Ministry of Education. We
digitised these figures from the Statistical Abstract published annually by the Kenya National
Bureau of Statistics.
Finally, we use a household panel dataset collected to evaluate the Hunger Safety Net
Programme (HSNP) to focus on Mandera andWajir, where a disproportionately high number
of terrorist attacks occur. In order to evaluate the HSNP, data were collected on 2,436
households in the counties Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana and Wajir (see Appendix A for a
map of these) over three years between August 2009 and November 2012. This dataset also
5The data are publicly available at dhsprogram.com.
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records children’s major activity (school attendance, work or staying at home), and thus
allows us to assess how other activities are affected by the presence of terrorist attacks.
It further lets us confirm the estimated effects not only for school enrolment, but also for
attendance.
The educational situation in Kenya: Children enrol in primary school at age 6, and
the school year runs from January to November. At the end of each year, children auto-
matically advance to the next year. We use retrospective information on school enrolment
contained in the DHS to construct a panel for Kenya’s 47 counties as follows. We consider
children who at the time of the interview were below 14 years old. For each child, we use
information on time spent in school to construct a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the
child enrolled in school at age 6.6 For each year and county, we then match the fraction
of children to which this applies to the number of terrorist attacks in the same year and
county.7
For children turning 6 between 2010 and 2014, 79.2 percent enrolled by the age of 6. Our
figure tallies with other measurements of education for similar years. The World Bank, for
instance, reports a net primary school enrolment rate of 81 percent in 2012 (the last year
available).8
Summary statistics: With 60.2 percent, enrolment in 2009 is considerable lower in the
northeast than in Kenya as a whole, see panel C of table 1. Whilst for the whole country,
gender gaps in enrolment are small, the northeastern regions show female disadvantages.
Panel A of figure 3 plots the dependent variable over time for the northeastern counties and
the rest of Kenya. The estimates show a clear parallel trends before 2008 and divergence
afterwards, when terrorist attacks increase.
3 The effect of terrorism on schooling
Before examining in detail the role of expectations and individuals’ perceptions in their re-
sponse to terrorist threats, this section estimates the causal effect of terrorism on school en-
rolment. For this, we provide evidence from three completely different data sources described
in the previous section. We employ a range of estimators including difference-in-differences,
instrumental variables and household fixed effects estimations.
6We include children aged 7 at the time of interview since these children may have turned 7 between
enrolling in school and being interviewed by the DHS.
7We drop the small percentage (6%) of children who either dropped out of school or repeated (despite
it being banned), since for them we cannot correctly calculate the age at which they enrolled.
8Data were downloaded from https://data.worldbank.org/; accessed November 2018. Net enrolment
is defined as the ratio of children of official school age who are enrolled in school to the population of the
same age.
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Figure 3: Terrorist attacks and schooling over time
(a) Unconditional means
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(b) Conditional differences
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Notes: Panel a reports proportion of children enrolling in school by age 6 for northeastern Kenya (Mandera,
Wajir and Garissa) and the rest of the country by year; Panel b reports conditional yearly differences in
the proportion of children enrolling in school by age 6 between northeastern Kenya (Mandera, Wajir and
Garissa) and the rest of the country; lower panel shows number of attacks carried out in northeastern Kenya
by year; Sources: Demographic Health Surveys and Global Terrorism Database.
3.1 Difference-in-differences and OLS estimations
We start by comparing—over time—counties hardest hit by terrorist attacks to the rest of
the country using the following difference-in-differences specification
enrolmentct = α postt × affectedc + γc + τt + uct, (1)
where we control for unobserved heterogeneity across counties c in factors determining the
level of enrolment, as well as country-wide variation in aggregate conditions over time t.
To ensure that our results are not driven by an arbitrary specification, we vary both the
definitions of regions experiencing terrorism (affectedc) and of the time period when terrorist
attacks occur (postt). In particular, we vary the cutoffs for postt = 1 between 2007 and 2011.
Similarly, we define affectedc = 1 for the three northeastern regions, and alternatively also
add Nairobi and Mombasa. We estimate equation (1) at the county level.
Table 2 reports the estimates for the difference-in-differences specifications. The data
used are drawn from the DHS and the dependent variable is the percentage of children en-
rolling in school on time, i.e. by age 6. The estimated effect is economically and statistically
significant, with a reduction in school enrolment of about 14 percentage points in regions
experiencing terrorist attacks compared to those that do not. In column (5) we test for a
difference in pre-trends and cannot reject that trends are indeed parallel.
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Table 2: Effect of terrorism on school enrolment: difference-in-differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: percentage of children in school by age 6
Mean in pre-period 57.2 57.9 59.2 60.6 55.9
Panel A: Affected = 1 for northeastern regions
Post × Affected −14.72 ∗ ∗ −14.80 ∗ ∗ −14.03 ∗ ∗ −14.17 ∗ ∗∗
(5.65) (5.64) (6.00) (5.21)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.777 0.778 0.778 0.777
Panel B: Affected = 1 for northeastern regions+Nairobi+Mombasa
Post × Affected −15.58 ∗ ∗∗ −15.27 ∗ ∗∗ −15.24 ∗ ∗∗ −14.90 ∗ ∗∗
(4.00) (4.09) (4.25) (4.07)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.777 0.782 0.782 0.781
Panel C: Test for parallel trends in pre-period (≤ 2007)
Trend × Affected −0.590
(0.730)
c and t effects YES
R squared 0.781
Observations 658 329
Post=1 for ≥ 2008 ≥ 2009 ≥ 2010 ≥ 2011
Notes: The table reports difference-in-differences estimates comparing the northeast (Mandera, Wajir and
Garissa) to the rest of Kenya; dependent variable is the county average of children enrolled in school by
age 6; data structure is a panel for the 47 counties for the years 2001-14; post = 1 for years after (and
including) 2008 (column 1), 2009 (column 2), 2010 (column 3) and 2011 (column 4); Affected = 1 for
northeasterN Kenya (Mandera, Wajir and Garissa) in panel A and Nairobi, Mombasa, Mandera, Wajir and
Garissa in panel B; data are drawn from 2009 and 2014 Kenyan DHS; panel C shows that parallel trends for
the pre-period cannot be rejected; standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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We also use this difference-in-differences framework to quantify and statistically test the
effect suggested in panel A of figure 3. For this, we substitute the postt dummy in equation
(1) with dummies for each year between 2002 and 2014. Panel B of figure 3 plots the yearly
differences in enrolment rates between the northeastern regions and the rest of the country
for each year. The results confirm large and statistically significant differences, which start
to appear only from 2007 onwards. Before that year, the trend appears parallel, which tallies
with our estimates from column (5) of table 2.
In order to quantify the effect of a single terrorist attack and to incorporate the fact that
some counties not located in the northeast also experience terrorist attacks, albeit not many,
we estimate a similar specification,
enrolmentct = δ attacksct + κc + θt + vct, (2)
where attacksct denotes the number of terrorist attacks occurring in county c in year t. We
estimate equation (2) both at the county level, and using individual data that allow us to
control for household and child characteristics. Results in both cases, reported in columns
(1) and (3) of table 3, are very similar, and suggest that each attack decreases the share of
children enrolling in time by 0.8-0.9 percentage points. This also lines up with the difference-
in-differences estimates, as affected counties experience about 15 attacks per year. We also
distinguish by gender of the child in columns (5) and (6), but find no significant differences.
3.2 Instrumenting terrorist attacks
Although we do not find evidence for a violation of the parallel trend assumption required
for consistency of the difference-in-differences estimates, the estimator would be biased if al-
Shabaab targets areas that experience shocks which are correlated with enrolment decisions.
One possible concern might be that it is al-Shabaab’s strategy to target areas experiencing
positive economic shocks, possibly in order to maximise impact and social distress. This
would induce an upward bias in estimates of the effect of terrorism on school enrolment.
Another possibility is related to findings by Limodio (2018), who documents the importance
of donations for the funding of Islamist organizations in Pakistan. If al-Shabaab can raise
higher donations in more aﬄuent areas and is more active there, this would again induce an
upward bias.
We address these concerns by exploiting some unique features of the context in which al-
Shabaab operates in order to instrument its choice of both timing and location of attacks. To
predict the geographical location of terror incidences, we show that the probability of attacks
decreases with distance to the Somali border. We combine this insight with three factors
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Table 3: Effect of terrorism on school enrolment: OLS & IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: percentage of children in school by age 6
OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS
Means 65.5 69.6 71.5 67.8
Terrorist attacks −0.890∗∗∗ −1.299∗∗∗ −0.785∗∗∗ −1.038∗∗∗ −0.691∗∗∗ −0.896∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.263) (0.193) (0.165) (0.122) (0.262)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
individual characteristics YES YES YES YES
F-statistic 37.4 16.3
R squared 0.780 0.779 0.229 0.229 0.255 0.211
Unit of observation county individual girls boys
Observations 658 40,657 20,168 20,489
Notes: The table reports the effect of terrorist attacks on school enrolment; Terrorist attacks is the number
of attacks classified as terrorist per county and year; Columns 1-2: dependent variable is the county average of
children enrolled in school by age 6; data structure is a panel for the 47 counties for the years 2001-14; column
2 uses 3 instruments: interaction of 1/distance and attacks by AQAP, Yemen’s exports of hydrocarbons in
previous year and coal imports by United Arab Emirates in previous year; Columns 3-6: dependent variable
takes value 100 if a child is enrolled in school by age 6; data structure is one observation per child; individual
controls include indicators for gender, rural community, electricity at dwelling, radio in household, television
in household; column 4 uses 3 instruments: interaction of 1/distance and attacks by AQAP, Yemen’s exports
of hydrocarbons in previous year and coal imports by United Arab Emirates in previous year; data are drawn
from 2009 and 2014 Kenyan DHS; standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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which influence the timing of attacks but are plausibly exogenous to the Kenyan context:
al-Shabaab’s affiliation to al-Qaeda, and revenue streams arising from hydrocarbon and coal
exports, both known to be major sources of revenues for these terrorist organisations. With
three resulting instruments, we have over-identification and can test instrument validity.
Location of attacks — Distance to Somali border: Carrying out terrorist attacks
is expensive9 and this cost is likely to increase with the distance from the area controlled
by the organisation in question. In the Kenyan case, this corresponds to distance from the
Somali border. An additional factor decreasing the costs of attacks close to the border in our
setting derives from the population in the border region being primarily of Somali ethnicity,
implying a lower cost for maintaining network structures and carrying out attacks. Distance
to border has also been used in other contexts as an instrument for terrorist attacks (Rehman
and Vanin, 2017).
We illustrate the predictive power of distance to the border by plotting the total number
of terrorist attacks each county experienced between 2001 and 2014 against the distance
between that county’s centroid and the Somali border. Figure 4 shows a clear negative
correlation and a hyperbolic shape. We provide further evidence on the importance of
distance to the border controlling for other county characteristics in Appendix C, confirming
that distance to border is by far the strongest predictor for the location of terrorist attacks.
Figure 4: Terrorist attacks and distance to Somali border
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Notes: The figure shows total number of attacks occurring in each of the 47 counties of Kenya between
2001 and 2014 by distance between the county and the Kenyan/Somali border; Source: Global Terrorism
Database.
To predict terrorist attacks in spacetime, we combine distance to border with three factors
9See, for instance: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/tracking-down-terrorist-financing (ac-
cessed December 2018)
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that affect the timing of al-Shabaab attacks. We interact each of these with distance to the
Somali border as follows
attacksct = φ timingt/distancec + λc + ιt + wct,
where distancec is the aerial distance between county c’s centroid and the closest point on
the Somali border. For timingt we use three separate instruments that we detail in turn.
Timing of attacks (I) — Al-Shabaab’s affiliation to al-Qaeda: We use al-Shabaab’s
position in the al-Qaeda network to obtain plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of ter-
rorist attacks carried out by al-Shabaab in Kenya. Al-Shabaab is an affiliate of al-Qaeda with
particularly strong ties to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). With encouragement
of al-Qaeda core, AQAP established and maintained close links with al-Shabaab (Rollins,
2011; Zarif, 2011). In practice, AQAP supports al-Shabaab in several ways. First, AQAP
provides al-Shabaab with financial help and it is believed that access to al-Qaeda’s resources
was one of the reasons for al-Shabaab’s loyalty pledge (Keatinge, 2014). Second, AQAP pro-
vides al-Shabaab directly with weapons and military training (Zimmermann, 2013). Third,
AQAP shares personnel with al-Shabaab. It is known, for instance, that fighters have crossed
the gulf of Aden to Somalia (Hansen, 2013). AQAP itself carries out attacks mainly in Yemen
and Saudi Arabia.
Unsurprisingly, there is no systematic data on the documented financial, material and
training support between terrorist organisations. Nonetheless, we do observe data patterns
that are highly consistent with the qualitative evidence provided in the literature. The strong
degree of coordination between the two organizations is supported by the high correlation
in the timing of attacks that we highlight in figure 5a, which reports the frequency of al-
Shabaab and AQAP attacks, grouped into 4 week intervals. Given its global standing, the
hierarchy plausibly puts AQAP above al-Shabaab in this relation (see also Lahoud, 2012;
Zimmermann, 2013).
To investigate the correlations between attacks of both organisations further, we construct
a weekly time series and regress the number of al-Shabaab attacks on attacks carried out
by AQAP.10 The latter operates in a completely different geographical region to al-Shabaab,
almost exclusively in the Arabian peninsula, and never in Africa.11 The parameter estimates
in table 4 show strong correlations, which are robust to different fixed effects. Moreover,
column (2) highlights that al-Shabaab attacks are correlated to AQAP attacks in the same
10We carry out Dickey-Fuller tests using various lags and reject the hypothesis of non-stationarity through-
out.
11The only terrorist incidences outside the Arabian peninsula attributed to AQAP were in the United
Kingdom, the United States, and most recently the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris 2015.
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Figure 5: Natural gas, coal and terrorist attacks by AQAP and al-Shabaab
(a) Attacks by AQAP and al-Shabaab
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week but not in previous or successive weeks. Yet more strikingly, when we distinguish
between private and public targets, we find that when AQAP attacks public (private) targets,
so does al-Shabaab (columns 3 and 4).
Table 4: Attacks by AQAP and al-Shabaab
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
Number of weekly al-Shabaab attacks by target
Target Any Any Public Private
Means 2.39 2.39 1.60 0.80
AQAP attacks 0.184 ∗ ∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.079)
AQAP attacks (t-1) 0.070
(0.077)
AQAP attacks (t-2) 0.046
(0.077)
AQAP attacks (t+1) 0.077
(0.077)
AQAP attacks (t+2) 0.003
(0.076)
AQAP attacks on “public” targets 0.295∗∗∗ −0.037
(0.072) (0.037)
AQAP attacks on “private” targets −0.191 0.157 ∗ ∗
(0.135) (0.070)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.740 0.753 0.707 0.593
Observations 728 726 728 728
Notes: The table reports correlations between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
activity, measured as the total number of attacks carried out by al-Shabaab and AQAP per week; public
targets are police, military, governments and educational institutions; private tagets are civilians, religious
leaders and businesses; data are drawn from Global Terrorism Database.
Timing of attacks (II) — Natural gas exports from Yemen: Our second source of
plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of terrorist attacks carried out by al-Shabaab in
Kenya is the volume of Yemen’s exports of liquid natural gas. Besides ransom and extortions,
AQAP derives a large part of its income from those exports (Fanusie and Entz, 2017a). Since,
as mentioned before, AQAP provides financial assistance to al-Shabaab, part of these gas
revenues may indirectly be channelled to al-Shabaab. This financial resource channel is
particularly important since terrorist organisations cannot easily save or borrow over time
(Limodio, 2018). The pipeline to Balhaf from where natural gas from Yemen is exported in
fact falls within territory controlled by AQAP, see map in Appendix A.
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Figure 5b illustrates the strong correlation between attacks by AQAP and liquid natural
gas exports. In 2014, less than 0.01 percent of Yemen’s natural gas are exported to Africa, so
that we can rule out any direct link with outcomes in Kenya.12 Our second instrument thus
predicts the timing of attacks by using Yemen’s exports of natural gas in hepta tons. We
use exports in year t− 1 to predict attacks in year t to account for a lag in AQAP actually
extracting funds from gas exports.
Timing of attacks (III) — Coal imports by the United Arab Emirates: Ex-
porting and trading charcoal is one of the largest sources of funding for al-Shabaab, which
generated an estimated USD 83 million per annum between 2012 and 2014 (Fanusie and
Entz, 2017b; United Nations Security Council, 2012). Gulf Countries are the main destina-
tion for Somali charcoal, with around 33 percent of Somali exports going the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) as one of the largest importers.13 Due to the close link between coal ex-
ports and al-Shabaab’s revenues, United Nations Security Council (2012) Resolution 2036
banned coal exports from Somalia in 2012. Despite this resolution, however, Somali coal ex-
ports continue illicitly and remain a major source of income for al-Shabaab (United Nations
Security Council, 2018).
We use imports of coal to the UAE as an exogenous shift in the demand for Somali
coal and thus for al-Shabaab’s finances. Figures from the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) show that between 2001 and 2012 Somalia accounted
for around 75 percent of all coal imported to the UAE. Again, demand for coal in the UAE
is arguably driven by factors exogenous to school enrolment choices by parents in Kenya.
Figure 5c shows a very strong correlation between coal imports to the UAE and al-Shabaab
attacks. The timing between the two figures further lends credence to a causal effect: coal
imports to the UAE tend to increase a few months before al-Shabaab attacks also rise.
In columns (2) and (4) of table 3 we use all three instruments simultaneously. The slightly
more negative 2SLS coefficients may point to the suspected upward bias in OLS estimates,
though the bias appears modest. The high F-statistics suggest that our three instruments
have a strong predictive power. Moreover, we cannot reject the validity of our instruments.
In appendix D we use all three instruments separately. The very similar estimates obtained
using our three different instruments are reassuring.
12Trade data reported in the section are retrieved from UNCTAD webpage https://unctadstat.unctad.
org. Own calculations. Accessed February 2019.
13Made from acacia trees growing abundantly across the Horn of Africa, this charcoal is particularly
prized for its long burning quality, which makes it ideally suited for smoking shisha.
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3.3 Robustness
Lags and an alternative measure of education: In table 5 we scrutinize our specification
in more detail. In column (1), we add the one year lag of attacks as an additional explanatory
variable. The estimates suggest that lagged attacks are not important conditional on attacks
in the same year. This supports our focus on contemporary attacks as the main explanatory
variable. In columns (2) and (3) we re-estimate the effect of terrorism on education using an
alternative data source. We digitised the total number of children in each county enrolled in
primary school from reports by the Kenyan Ministry of Education. Column (2) shows that
each attack decreases the number of pupils by 243 (controlling for the total population).
Column (3) confirms that for this data source, the lag of attacks is not important either.
Distinguishing between perpetrators and types of violence: The GTD cannot
attribute every attack unambiguously to an actor or organisation. As shown in figure 2, for
some attacks the perpetrators are unknown. To illustrate the effect of attacks attributable
to al-Shabaab only, we use only confirmed attacks. Column (4) of table 5 shows a negative
effect, the magnitude of which exceeds the corresponding one for all attacks shown in column
(1) of table 3 above. In column (5) we compare these estimates with conflict data from the
ACLED project. The ACLED reports actors of incidences of violence and we select al-
Shabaab attacks only. The estimates are remarkably similar across both data sources. In
column (6) we use information on other incidences of violence contained in the ACLED to
compare the effect of terrorism to that of other types of violence. The estimates show that
once we control for terrorist attacks, other incidences of violence have a very small impact
on schooling.
The effect of terrorism on migration: To investigate whether the increase in terrorist
activity led individuals to migrate out of affected areas, we use information contained in the
2014 DHS on past migration. The survey reports the number of years respondents have been
living at their current residence. Using this information, we create a panel for each woman,
where the dependent variable takes the value 100 if she moved to her current residence in
any given year t. Regressing this on the number of attacks within the same county and
year shows that terrorist attacks have no impact on in-migration (see Appendix E). As
an alternative measure, we digitised county populations from official records for the years
2001 to 2014. The estimates show no significant effect of terrorist attacks on the number of
residents either.
Government responses to terrorist attacks and other robustness checks: We
further digitised data from official government reports to investigate the robustness of our
results with respect to two different types of expenditure. First, since Kenya provides a
contingent for the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), we analyse government
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Table 5: Effect of terrorism - robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables:
% of kids Nr of
in school kids in % of kids in school by age 6
by age 6 school
Means 65.5 203,780 65.5
Terrorist attacks −0.808∗∗∗ −243.37 ∗ ∗∗ −211.10 ∗ ∗∗
(0.245) (81.83) (74.35)
Terrorist attacks (lag) −0.061 −70.92
(0.176) (77.08)
Attacks by al-Shabaab −1.285∗∗∗ −1.403∗∗∗ −1.377∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.246) (0.248)
Incidences of other violence −0.023
(0.082)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
county population YES YES
R squared 0.772 0.99 0.99 0.781 0.780 0.780
Source of education data DHS MoE MoE DHS DHS DHS
Source of violence data GTD GTD GTD GTD ACLED ACLED
Observations 611 282 282 658 658 658
Notes: The table reports the effect of terrorist attacks on school enrolment; Terrorist attacks is the number
of attacks classified as terrorist per county and year; Terrorist attacks (lag) is the number of attacks classified
as terrorist per county in previous year; Attacks by al-Shabaab is the number of attacks attributed to al-
Shabaab per county and year; Incidences of other violence is the number of incidences of violence not
attributed to al-Shabaab per county and year; data structure is a panel for the 47 counties for the years
2001-14; all standard errors are clustered at county level; Column 1: dependent variable is the percentage
of children enrolled in school per county and year; data structure is one observation per county and per
year; Columns 2 and 3: dependent variable is the total number of children in school per county and year;
data structure is one observation per county and per year, data drawn from Ministry of Education (MoE);
Columns 4 to 6: dependent variable is the percentage of children enrolled in school per county and year; data
structure is one observation per county and per year.
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expenditure on security. Second, we explore education expenditure. Including measures for
both does not change our results. Moreover, we estimate specifications where we drop the
two largest cities (Nairobi and Mombasa), use only the years 2009 to 2014 from the 2014
DHS, and include a separate time trend for the three northeastern counties. These results
are reported in appendix E and show that the effect of terrorist attacks persists throughout.
3.4 Panel estimates
Finally, we re-estimate the effect of terrorism using disaggregate data from the Hunger
Safety Net Programme (HSNP) household panel. This allows us to focus on variation within
a subset of affected counties, controlling for unobserved household characteristics.
In panel C of table 1 we compare characteristics of children and adults from the HSNP in
2010 (its baseline) with individuals drawn from the 2009 round of the representative Kenyan
DHS. Although the HSNP was not designed as a representative sample of the counties it sur-
veyed, the characteristics of its respondents are remarkably similar to the overall populations
in those counties.
The HSNP reports the location of respondents’ residence. We use this information to de-
fine a location to be affected by terrorism if it is located within 25km of an attack. Appendix
A shows attacks as red points, affected municipalities in yellow and unaffected ones in green.
We estimate a model based on equation (2), for which we count the number of attacks in
the 12 months prior to interview. The estimation sample includes children aged 6 to 14 at
the time of interview and the dependent variable takes the value 100 if the child is currently
attending school. This dataset allows us to corroborate our results for attendance rather
than enrolment, which we have used so far. Notice that given our focus on within-household
variation, here we consider school attendance of children of any age.
The parameter estimates in columns (1) and (2) of table 6 show a significant negative
impact of terrorism of a magnitude comparable to the DHS estimates in table 3. Columns
(3) and (4) further show that the effect persists even conditional on household fixed effects.
Before turning to the mechanisms explaining the observed negative effect of attacks on
enrolment, we can use this household panel to investigate whether this coincides with an
increased share of children working. The dataset lets us distinguish whether children go
to school, stay at home or work outside, categories that we explicitly incorporate in the
behavioural model of Section 5. Columns (5) to (8) of table 6 repeat the estimations for
working as the outcome variable. In our definition ”working” excludes unpaid domestic work.
The effect is estimated equally precisely, though closer to zero. It suggests that rather than
increasing the tendency to work for a wage outside the home, the lower school attendance
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Table 6: Effect of terrorism on child activities: household panel data from northeastern
Kenya
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable = 100 if child is currently
Enrolled in school Working outside house
Means 61.3 15.2
Terrorist attacks −1.229∗∗∗ −1.215∗∗∗ −0.928 ∗ ∗ −0.885 ∗ ∗ 0.041 0.075 −0.054 −0.064
(0.333) (0.321) (0.325) (0.326) (0.242) (0.236) (0.203) (0.197)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.016 0.092 0.021 0.094 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.064
Covariates no yes no yes no yes no yes
Cluster FE yes yes no no yes yes no no
Household FE no no yes yes no no yes yes
Observations 7,077
Notes: The table reports the effect of terrorism on primary school attendance and child labour; terrorist
attacks denote the number of terrorist attacks in the last 12 months wihtin a 25km radius of the municipality
in which the child resides in; data are drawn from Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) for counties
Mandera and Wajir; columns 1-4: dependent variable takes 100 if child reports to be currently enrolled in
school; columns 5-8: dependent variable takes 100 if child reports to be currently working outside the house;
sample consists of children aged 6-14 at time of interview; all standard errors are clustered at municipality
level.
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due to terrorist attacks coincides with an increase in the number of children staying home.
Thus, the reduction in school enrolment is unlikely to be driven by economic needs. In the
next section, we explore the mechanisms behind the observed effects in more detail.
4 The importance of expectations and perceptions
Terrorism differs from other types of violence, such as civil war or gun crime, in as much as its
direct effect on infrastructure and casualties is relatively low. Yet, its economic impact can
be severe. In a commentary for the Wall Street Journal, Becker and Murphy (2001) predicted
terrorism to only have a limited economic impact, due to the small share of capital stock it
destroys. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) instead provide evidence for a more substantial
effect. They contend that terrorism affects expectations, which in turn may lower foreign
direct investment and hamper economic growth.
We extend this logic to human capital investment. Rather than through a direct physical
impact, terrorism primarily alters expectations about the risks and returns associated with
schooling. Nonetheless, the reduced form effects of terrorism based on equations (1) and (2)
capture the sum of such indirect effects and a potential direct physical impact that terrorism
shares with other forms of violence. A key empirical challenge is to disentangle these two.
In this section we provide three pieces of evidence which all point towards a crucial role
of expectations in households’ schooling decisions. First, we find that attacks occurring not
in the immediate vicinity of Kenyan children’s residence or on their way to school have a
significant effect on school enrolment. For children in the border region, we document an
effect even for attacks carried out in Somalia. Second, threats made by terrorist organisations
and media coverage of terrorist attacks, which by themselves do not affect infrastructure or
school personnel directly, are strongly and negatively associated with enrolment. Third,
terrorism is found to affect self reported attitudes towards violence but has no impact on
violence actually experienced.
4.1 Geographical location of attacks
In this section we first shed light on the importance of indirect factors by examining the
proximity of attacks to respondents’ homes and the way to the closest primary school. A
second set of results rules out any direct effect by examining the effect of attacks on Somali
soil on education outcomes in Kenya.
Both sets of estimations show the same pattern: Attacks in close proximity to individuals
have the strongest impact on educational choices. Nonetheless, incidences further away and
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not on the way to the closest primary school retain a strong and significant negative impact,
even if they are located in a different administrative area. The latter shows that indirect
channels, such as changes in expectations, have an effect that cannot be explained by direct
physical impacts.
Attacks in Kenya (I) - distance to respondents: We begin by considering attacks
within a given radius around the geographic coordinate of respondents’ residence. This
approach is similar to the one adopted in a recent study by Bertoni et al. (2018). The
estimates in column (1) of table 7 show that terrorist attacks within 10km have a strong
negative impact.
Crucially for our argument, however, column (2) shows a significant effect also of terrorist
attacks that occur further away in the county (denoted as “Anywhere else in county”). The
estimated effects are smaller than the ones for attacks within the 10km radius. This is to be
expected, as the effect of attacks in the vicinity of children includes both direct and indirect
effects of terrorism, and indirect effects plausibly increase with proximity. Nonetheless, the
magnitude of attacks not located close to individuals is sizeable, around 0.6 percentage points
per attack.
Attacks in Kenya (II) - way to school: To focus more closely on the effect on
education, we isolate attacks occurring along and at a distance from each childs way to
school. For this, we follow the methodology proposed by Koppensteiner and Menezes (2018),
who use detailed information on children’s way to school to estimate the effect of gun violence
in Rio de Janeiro. Urban gun crime typically is highly localised, with a rather direct impact
on children. Our emphasis on the indirect effects of terrorism differs from this and mandates
that we focus on attacks without an immediate effect, and thus not on the way to school.
To measure which attacks occur on the way to school, we overlay the geographic coor-
dinates of children’s residences with the coordinates of all 31,231 primary schools in Kenya,
provided by the Kenya Open Data Initiative (KODI) Primary Schools dataset.14 See ap-
pendix A for a map of the DHS clusters and of Kenya’s primary schools. For each child, we
identify the closest school. The mean distance to the closest school is 1.98km. To account
for possible detours on the way to school, we create a corridor of 5km around the shortest
connecting line between each child and the closest school. This corridor includes a 5km ra-
dius around the school, and thus captures any attacks occurring in the vicinity of the school.
As before, we add a variable counting the number of terrorist attacks occurring in the same
administrative unit the child reside in but not on its way to school (denoted as ”Anywhere
else in county”).
Column (3) of table 7 suggests that attacks occurring along the way to school have a
14Available under https://hub.arcgis.com/datasets/66cfcf6d3724405bb15b0099faa46142_0.
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strong effect, with each attack decreasing the probability of a child enrolling by 1.1 percentage
points. In column (4) we add the number of terrorist attacks in the same county but not
falling between a child’s residence and the closest primary school. As before, the coefficient
estimate has a significant magnitude of around -0.7 percentage points. Columns (5) and (6)
show that these effects are stronger for children living further than 2km from the nearest
school. A possible explanation is that longer journeys to school make terrorist attacks a
stronger concern. To allow for spatial dependence amongst children, we compute Conley
standard errors (Conley, 1999). The results remain robust and are available upon request.
Table 7: Effect of terrorist attacks for different distances from child and on way to school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
= 100 if child in school by age 6
Mean 69.6 75.5 45.1
Nr of terrorist attacks by location:
≤ 10km from child −1.176∗∗∗ −1.284∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.116)
Between child and closest school −1.116∗∗∗ −1.222∗∗∗ −1.082∗∗∗ −1.836 ∗ ∗
(0.230) (0.141) (0.150) (0.741)
Anywhere else in county −0.649∗∗∗ −0.695∗∗∗ −0.539∗∗∗ −0.853 ∗ ∗
(0.234) (0.240) (0.335) (0.215)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
individual characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to closest school < 2km ≥ 2km
R squared 0.228 0.230 0.228 0.230 0.187 0.187
Unit of observation Child
Observations 40,657 32,727 7,930
Notes: The table reports the effect of terrorist attacks on school enrolment by precise geographical location
of attacks; Terrorist attacks (≤ 10km) is the number of attacks within 10km from each child per year;
Between child and closest school is the number of attacks occurring between each child and the closest
school per year; Anywhere else in county is the number of attacks per year that occur within the county
of residence of the child but not within 10km (in column 2) and not between child and nearest school (in
column 4); data are drawn from 2009 and 2014 round of DHS; all standard errors are clustered at county
level.
Attacks in Somalia (I) - Kenyan border counties: The above results confirm that
attacks do not have to occur on the way to school to affect education. It is strong evidence
in favour of an indirect effect of terrorism. To further rule out that the effect operates, for
instance, via casualties among teachers and a disruption of educational services, we note the
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fact that the provision of education changes discretely at international borders. We focus
on north-eastern Kenya, and estimate whether attacks occurring in Somalia but close to the
border have an effect on enrolment in Kenya. An effect of terrorist attacks in Somalia on
Kenyan infrastructure or education personnel is improbable. However, given the geographic
proximity and shared ethnicity in the border region, Kenyans likely are well aware of violent
events across the border.15 We count the annual number of terrorist attacks in the two
Somali provinces sharing a border with Kenya,16 and interact this number with an indicator
for the three Kenyan counties that share a border with Somalia.17 By adding this interaction
to the specification in equation (2), we can test whether the impact of terrorist attacks in
Somalia on enrolment is larger in Kenyan border regions than in the rest of the country. The
effect of Somali attacks on the whole of Kenya is absorbed by the time fixed effects. Column
(1) of table 8 shows that each attack in the Somali border region decreases enrolment by 0.1
percentage points more in Kenyan border regions than the rest of the country. This holds
despite the fact that we control for attacks carried out in each county. Column (2) considers
Kenyan counties located in the east of the country only (highlighted in yellow in map (g) of
Appendix A).18 The estimates remain robust.
Attacks in Somalia (II) - different distances from Kenyan children: Finally, to
estimate the direct, rather than the relative, effect of Somali terrorist attacks, we focus on
individuals. Using respondents’ geographic coordinates, we count, for each year, the number
of attacks which occurred within a given radius around each child and which were carried
out on Somali soil. To again condition on attacks in each county, we add this variable to
equation (2).
Columns (3) and (4) of table 8 show that Somali attacks have a large and significant
negative effect on school enrolment among Kenyan children living within 250km and 100km
from the attack. Each attack decreases the probability of enrolling in school on time by 0.2
percentage points and 0.5 percentage points respectively. As would be expected, for both
radii the effect is considerably smaller than the effect of attacks occurring in the child’s
own county. Columns (5) and (6) select only children living in eastern Kenya; as before,
highlighted in yellow in Appendix A. The estimates remain strong and significant for this
sub-sample.19
15Overlaying Kenyan administrative boundaries with ethnographic maps based on the classical Soviet
Atlas Narodov Mira shows that the three northeastern regions fall into the ethnic homeland of Somalis,
which make up almost all of Somalia as well (Weidmann et al., 2010).
16These are Jubbada Hoose and Gedo.
17These are Mandera, Wajir and Garissa.
18We use counties in the three regions: Northeast, East and Coast
19We also estimate the same specification using a radius of 50km around each child and the results remain
robust, although the number of treated observation becomes rather small. The estimates are available from
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Table 8: Effect of terrorist attacks in Somalia on education in Kenya
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables
% in school by age 6 Dummy for child in school by age 6
Means 65.5 60.9 69.6 69.6 61.5 61.5
Attacks in Somalia × NE dummy −0.096∗∗∗ −0.098 ∗ ∗
(0.033) (0.035)
Attacks in Somalia ≤250km −0.190∗∗∗ −0.190 ∗ ∗
(0.068) (0.076)
Attacks in Somalia ≤100km −0.479∗∗∗ −0.481 ∗ ∗
(0.130) (0.179)
Attacks in same county −0.660∗∗∗ −0.507∗∗∗ −0.624∗∗∗ −0.746∗∗∗ −0.514∗∗∗ −0.631∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.156) (0.114) (0.169) (0.105) (0.161)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.781 0.784 0.230 0.229 0.229 0.231
Unit of observation county Child
Sample all East all all East East
Observations 658 238 40,657 40,657 15,204 15,204
Notes: The table reports the effect of terrorist attacks in Somalia on educational enrolment in Kenya;
Terrorist attacks is the number of attacks classified as terrorist per county and year; Attacks in Somalia are
total number of attacks in the two most western provinces of Somalia per year; NE dummy is an indicator
taking the value 1 for the three northeastern Kenyan counties bordering Somalia (Mandera, Wajir and
Garissa); Attacks in Somalia ≤ 250km are attacks on Somali soil occurring within 250km of child i per year;
Attacks in Somalia ≤ 100km are attacks on Somali soil occurring within 100km of child i per year; East of
Kenya consists of three regions: Eastern, Coast and Northeastern region; all standard errors are clustered
at county level.
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4.2 Threats of terrorism and media coverage of terrorist attacks
As a further corroboration of the importance of expectations, we analyse the role of two
factors for which we can plausibly rule out any direct effect on infrastructure or the number
of casualties. First, we consider threats made by terrorist organisations. A common strategy
among these organisations is to issue threats of attacks or violence with reference to more
or less precisely stated target locations. We find a strong relation between terrorist threats
made about a particular area and primary school enrolment in that region. These persist
even after we control for any terrorist incidences actually occurring in the region. Second, we
estimate the role of media coverage of terrorist attacks. Again, we find a negative relation,
which is robust to the inclusion of the number of attacks actually carried out.
The data for this analysis are drawn from the Global Database of Events, Language, and
Tone (GDELT) project. The GDELT monitors media outlets such as print, broadcast and
web news worldwide, and provides information on organisations, people, themes, quotes,
images and many more in almost real time.20 For Kenya, the GDELT records to which of
the country’s 8 regions an event refers (see map in Appendix A). We use this information
to construct a region/year panel, which we then match with primary school information on
the 47 counties used so far, which are sub-strata of the 8 regions.
The GDELT keeps a record of threats made. These are defined as exclusively verbal
acts. The two sub-categories of threats most relevant for the present purpose are threats of
“unconventional forms of violence”, which the GDELT stipulates include terrorist threats,
and threats of “unconventional forms of mass violence”. Using this information, we sum
all terrorist threats per region/year and include it to the OLS specification of equation (2).
Figure 6 shows the evolution of terrorist threats and media coverage of terrorist attacks for
Kenya and Somalia.
Panel A of table 9 shows the correlation between threats made to a particular area of
Kenya and the number of actual attacks carried out in that area, net of time and county
effects. The coefficient estimate is small and not statistically different from zero, suggesting
a rather weak correlation between threats and actual occurrence of attacks. Panel B in-
vestigates the relationship between terrorist threats and educational enrolment. Column (1)
shows a strong negative relationship between threats and the percentage of children in school
by age 6. Column (2) highlights that this relation remains robust even after we control for
attacks carried out in that particular region. This suggests an association of threats with
educational outcomes above and beyond the number of attacks actually carried out in a given
region. We also test whether terrorist threats made regarding Somalia affect behaviour in
the authors upon request.
20The data are freely available under https://www.gdeltproject.org/.
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Figure 6: Threat of terrorism and media coverage of terrorist attacks
(a) Number of terrorist threats
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(b) Number of mentions in international media
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Notes: The figure shows yearly totals of terror threats in Kenya and Somalia (panel a) and yearly number
of mentions in international media on terrorism in Kenya and Somalia (panel b); Source: Global Database
of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT).
the Kenyan border region. As before, we interact the Somalia specific variable with a dummy
for the three Kenyan counties bordering Somalia. Column (3) shows a strong negative cor-
relation. These latter results are noteworthy. It is possible that threats regarding a Kenyan
region are determined by unobservable shocks in that same region (which in turn also affect
education). The effect of threats issued against another country, by contrast, are less likely
to suffer from the same bias. Hence these results can be plausibly interpreted as causal.
Next, we investigate media coverage of terrorist events. The GDELT records and classifies
violent events. We define the following events as occurrences of terrorism: bombing (whether
suicide, car or other non-military), abductions (including hijacking and taking of hostages)
and assassinations of a known person (whether successful or not). In general, the GDELT
classifies these events as uses of unconventional violence as opposed to uses of violence that
are conventional in the sense of using military force. For each region and year, we sum media
mentions across all of GDELT’s source documents. Following practice suggested by GDELT,
we then divide this sum by the total number of mentions regarding Kenya. Mentions of
terrorist attacks are negatively related to school enrolment (column 4) even after we condition
on the actual incidence of terrorist attacks (column 5). Column (6) further shows that
mentions of terrorist attacks occurring in Somalia have a negative relation to education in
Kenyan border regions. To investigate whether we are just picking up spurious correlations,
we carry out two placebo treatments. Instead of mentions of terrorist attacks, we include
mentions of “guns” (column 8) and “killings” (column 9). The coefficients on these two are
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Table 9: Threats of terrorism, media coverage of attacks and school enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Effect of terrorism on threats and media coverage
Dependent variables Terror Media
threats coverage
Means 0.77 2.55
Terrorist attacks 0.009 0.370 ∗ ∗
(0.028) (0.178)
c and t effects YES YES
R squared 0.491 0.602
Panel B: Effect of terrorist threats and media coverage on education
Dependent variable Percentage of children in school by age 6
Mean 65.5
Terrorist threats −0.697 ∗ ∗ −0.666 ∗ ∗
(0.299) (0.284)
Threats for −0.199∗∗∗
SOM × NE (0.036)
Media coverage of −0.399∗∗∗ −0.206∗
terrorism (0.078) (0.115)
Media coverage for −0.228∗
SOM × NE (0.130)
Media coverage of −0.943∗
terrorism (z score) (0.525)
Media coverage of −0.304
killings (z score) (0.306)
Media coverage of −0.455
guns (z score) (0.729)
Terrorist attacks −0.884∗∗∗ −0.906∗∗∗ −0.814∗∗∗ −0.780∗∗∗ −0.814∗∗∗ −0.881∗∗∗ −0.842∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.193) (0.196) (0.211) (0.196) (0.194) (0.202)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.774 0.781 0.781 0.775 0.781 0.781 0.781 0.780 0.780
Unit of observation county
Observations 658
Notes: The table reports relations between terrorist threats and media coverage of attacks and educational
enrolment in Kenya; Terrorist attacks is the number of attacks classified as terrorist per county and year;
Terrorist threats is the number of verbal threats issues by terrorist organisations for the respective region
in Kenya; Terrorist threats SOM is the number of verbal threats issues by terrorist organisations for the
whole of Somalia; NE dummy is an indicator taking the value 1 for the three northeastern Kenyan counties
bordering Somalia (Mandera, Wajir and Garissa); Media coverage of terrorism is the proportion of mentions
in international media on Kenya regions that cover terrorism; Media coverage of terrorism SOM is the
proportion of mentions in international media on Somalia that cover terrorism; Media coverage of killings is
the proportion of mentions in international media on Kenya regions that cover killed or murdered individuals;
Media coverage of guns is the proportion of mentions in international media on Kenya regions that cover
guns or gun crime; all standard errors are clustered at county level.
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much smaller and statistically insignificant (we report z-scores for better comparability).
4.3 Attitudes
We also provide direct evidence on individuals’ self-reported experiences of and attitudes
towards violence. Our results suggest that terrorist attacks have no significant impact on self-
reported experiences of violence. They do, however, have a large and statistically significant
effect on fear of violence, life satisfaction and optimism regarding the future.
The data for this analysis are drawn from four rounds of the Afrobarometer for Kenya
(carried out in 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2015). Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more
than 30 African countries and collect information on attitudes towards social, religious,
political and economic topics as well as on experiences of crime and violence. We pool all
four cross-sections and match respondents’ county of residence to terrorist attacks in that
location as reported by the GTD. We then estimate a specification as in equation (2), with
the Afrobarometer responses as the dependent variable.
Attitudes are measured using three questions. The dependent variable in each case takes
the value 1 if the respondent i) is often afraid of crime, ii) reports his or her living conditions
to be “good” or “very good”, and iii) expects the future economic conditions to be better
than the present.21 The parameter estimates in figure 7a show large and significant effects
of terrorist attacks on all three measures of attitudes.
By contrast, when we analyse self-reported experiences of violence, we find no such
relations. For self-reported experiences of violence, the dependent variable takes the value
1 if the respondent reports to have i) experienced an attack and ii) had anything stolen.22
The results are reported in figure 7b and suggest no significant effect of terrorism on these
two outcomes. The parameter estimates are small in size and not significantly different from
zero.
5 A model of expectations and enrolment choices
Having provided evidence supporting the importance of indirect effects in the previous sec-
tion, we use this insight to formulate a model of activity choice for children that accounts
21The respective questions are i) “Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your
family: Feared crime in your own home?”, ii)“In general, how do you rate: Your living conditions compared
to those of other Kenyans?”, and iii) “Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse:
Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time?”
22The questions are “Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family: Been
physically attacked?” and “Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family: Had
something stolen from your house?”, respectively
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Figure 7: Terrorist attacks and experiences of and attitudes towards violence
(a) Experiences of violence
Fears crime in own home
Own situation better than others
Economic conditions will improve
-.02 -.01 0 .01 .02
(b) Attitudes towards violence
In last year had anything stolen
In last year was ever attacked
-.02 -.01 0 .01 .02
Notes: The figure shows coefficient estimates on terrorist attacks defined as the number of attacks classified
as terrorist per county and year on attitudes towards violence (panel a) and experiences of violence (panel
b); point estimates are shown as dots; 95% confidence intervals are indicated as horizontal lines; Source:
Afrobarometer (2005-2015).
for parents’ expectations about the costs and benefits of schooling relative to other activities
in the presence of terrorism. Indirect effects include both a change in expectations about
the danger of going to school, as well as expectations about the returns to schooling. We
use the model to disentangle these two channels. The model’s structural parameters are
estimated using choices observed in the household panel described in Section 3.4. To keep
the structural estimation both credible and close to the reduced-form estimates above, we
exploit some of the same quasi-experimental variation for identification as before. We then
first evaluate the degree of agents’ misperception regarding the risk of dying in a terrorist
attack. Second, we contrast the effect of this perceived risk to an expected decrease in the
returns to schooling. Finally, we use the model to obtain an estimate of the longer-term
welfare cost of terrorism.
5.1 Model
In line with the analysis in Section 3.4, we distinguish choices made by parents of child i in
two types of location li of north-eastern Kenya: those that after 2010 experience a terrorist
attack, and those that do not; hence, li ∈ {NT, T}.
Childhood: When children are at the age of six, parents decide whether to enroll them
in school. If children do attend school, households face a location-specific monetary cost
cli . If not in school, children either work to earn a wage wlic or stay at home. Like wage
and schooling cost, the value of a child’s home production may vary across locations, and is
worth ηli . We denote these three activities with S(chool), W (ork) and H(ome). In addition
to the monetary payoffs associated with each activity, parents are heterogeneous in terms of
their preference viS, v
i
W and v
i
H for each option.
The payoffs in location li associated with these three options during childhood are thus
given by
U liiS =
Tc∑
t=1
βt−1(−cli) + viS if in school
U liiW =
Tc∑
t=1
βt−1wlic + v
i
W if working
U liiH =
Tc∑
t=1
βt−1ηli + viH if staying home,
where β is an annual discount factor, and Tc is the duration of childhood post age six.
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Adult life: Positive returns to education imply that the schooling decision during child-
hood affects continuation values during adult life. For individuals with and without school
education in location li, these continuation values are given by
V liei =
Ta∑
t=1
βTc+t−1wliei ,
where ei = {E,NE} indicates whether individual i has attended school, w
li
ei
is the corre-
sponding wage as an adult, and Ta denotes the duration of adult working life.
24
Payoffs under terrorism: The presence of terrorist attacks affects the decision between
the different activities via two distinct channels. First, if not staying at home, children face
the risk of being caught in an attack. Thus, with probability pi, households each period incur
a utility loss C associated with this event. Second, the rise in terrorist attacks may be seen
as an indication of a longer-term deterioration of security and stability of the region, which
would affect future returns to education. In the model, we thus allow parents to expect that
with some probability ψ future wages for educated and non-educated workers in the Kenyan
locations affected by terrorist attacks fall to w˜TE and w˜
T
NE, respectively.
23Primary school in Kenya covers ages 6 to 14, and so in the estimation, we set Tc = 8.
24In the estimatation, we set Ta = 40.
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To mirror the difference-in-differences setup used above, we distinguish agents’ decisions
in two locations before and after the start of terrorist attacks. As explained below, we
estimate the model on the HSNP data, and take its last wave in 2012 as the post-period,
when terrorist attacks have started. The unconditional probability of dying in an attack in
period t, while having survived so far is given by pi(1 − pi)t−1. Thus the payoffs for agents
facing terrorist attacks in location li = T in 2012 become:
UT,2012iS =
Tc∑
t=1
βt−1(1− pi)t(−cT ) + βt−1pi(1− pi)t−1C + viS if in school
UT,2012iW =
Tc∑
t=1
βt−1(1− pi)twTc + β
t−1pi(1− pi)t−1C + viW if working
UT,2012iH =
Tc∑
t=1
βt−1ηT + viH if staying home
during childhood, and
V T,2012ei = (1− ψ)
Ta∑
t=1
βt−1(1− pi)twTe + ψ
Ta∑
t=1
βt−1(1− pi)tw˜Te + β
t−1pi(1− pi)t−1C,
during adult life.
Under the assumption that preference shocks vi are independent and extreme value dis-
tributed, the choice probabilities have a closed for solution.25 This allows a straight forward
solution of the model by backward induction. To estimate the model’s parameters, we draw
both on estimates of the kind reported in Section 3.4, and a number of additional moments
detailed below.
5.2 Identification and Estimation
In the Hunger Safety Net Programme evaluation data (see Section 3.4), we directly observe
wages for adults with and without schooling, wages earned by children, as well as the cost
of schooling. Table 10 lists the means of these variables, as we feed them into the structural
model. Since here we focus on households in only two counties, the remaining regional
differences largely reflect rural-urban gaps in wages and schooling costs. These, together
with the different values of home production ηNT and ηT to be estimated can explain the
enrolment difference across areas. As we demonstrate below, the model is able to replicate
25We allow for different standard deviations σl
v
of vi in the two locations. Additivity of v in the utility
function, independence and extreme value distribution imply that the location choice probabilities take a
logistic form, with value functions in the home and host country as arguments (see e.g. Rust, 1987).
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this difference very precisely.
Table 10: Data used in the structural estimation.
Mean Std.dev.
adult wage, non-educated, non-terror region, wNTNE 784.57 (508.06)
adult wage, educated, non-terror region, wNTE 1,290.65 (775.71)
adult wage, non-educated, terror region, wTNE 908.10 (649.07)
adult wage, educated, terror region, wTE 1,384.05 (813.60)
child wage, non-terror region, wNTc 389.08 (295.17)
child wage, terror region, wTc 373.51 (262.06)
schooling costs, non-terror region, cNTS 39.20 (98.13)
schooling costs, terror region, cTS 75.46 (144.22)
Notes: Terror regions include areas within a 25km radius of a terrorist at-
tack. Numbers refer to the first round of the HSNP survey (2010), before the
increase in the number of attacks the counties Madera and Wajir. Source:
Hunger Safety Net Programme evaluation data.
The parameters to be estimated are the values ηNT and ηT of home production in the
two types of location, the spread parameters σNTv and σ
T
v of the transitory preference shocks,
and the subjective probabilities pi and ψ perceived by parents that a child is hit in a terrorist
attack and that economic conditions in Kenya deteriorate.26 We estimate these parameters
by general method of moments (GMM), exploiting for identification amongst others the
quasi-experimental variation induced by terrorist attacks across regions and time.
To identify the values of home production ηNT and ηT , as well as the spread parameters
σNTv and σ
T
v , we use the observed school attendance rates of children in different Kenyan
regions, as well as the share of children who are working. Identification of the components
determining payoffs in the presence of terrorist attacks requires additional information. In
the model, the incentive to invest in children’s education may be reduced for two reasons:
the risk of children being hit in an attack, as well as an expected deterioration in the
returns to education. To separately identify these mechanisms, we closely follow the spirit
of the reduced-form estimation of Section 3, where we have used a variety of estimators to
establish that terrorist attacks have a negative effect on school enrollment in Kenya. We use
difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of terrorism on both school enrolment and on
the propensity to work as moments for which the model predicts a direct counterpart. Using
these reduced form effects, the model identifies the change in expected payoffs via which
terrorism affects parental decisions: First, a negative effect on activities that require some
traveling outside the home (work and school attendance) implies an expected utility cost of
a child being hit in a terrorist attack. Second, a difference between the treatment effects
on school attendance and the fraction of children working is informative about a change in
the expected returns to schooling in regions affected by terrorist attacks in 2012 relative to
26The discount factor is set to β = 0.95.
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non-terror locations.
Note that in both cases only the change in expected payoffs can be identified, which
consist both of the respective probability of an event and the loss associated with it. That
is, in the first case only a combination of pi and C can be identified empirically, in the second
case only a combination of ψ, w˜TE and w˜
T
NE. In order to obtain interpretable magnitudes, we
thus take values for C, w˜TE and w˜
T
NE from data and the literature, in order to then estimate
pi and ψ alongside the other parameters of the model. More specifically, we set C = 577, 000
(PPP adjusted USD), corresponding to the value of a statistical life estimated in a recent
paper by Leo´n and Miguel (2017) for Sierra Leone. This allows us to obtain an estimate
of the perceived probability pi that we can contrast to the actually observed ratio of annual
casualties to population size in the affected regions.
Wages w˜TE and w˜
T
NE are not readily observed, and we estimate ψ under different assump-
tions. First, we consider the two extreme cases that returns to education drop to zero, or
alternatively decrease by 10% only. As table 12 below shows, this yields a reasonably narrow
range of estimates for ψ between 0.4 and 1.2 percent. To narrow this down further, note
that we observe a presumably close proxy which agents in the affected Kenyan regions are
well-aware of: The counties Mandera and Wajir directly border southern Somalia, and the
majority of the population in these counties are ethnic Somalis. In Section 4.1 we moreover
have shown that even conditional on close-by attacks in Kenya, school enrolment in this
region is affected by attacks that occur across the border in Somalia. Hence, we use the
Somali High Frequency Survey (available for 2016) to compute mean wages for adults with
and without schooling in Somalia, and use this information to fix w˜TE and w˜
T
NE. This allows
us to obtain a point estimate for ψ, which in this case represents the perceived probability
that economic conditions in Kenya become like in its terror-ridden neighboring country, just
across the border of the counties we consider.27 An advantage of the additive separability of
the payoff terms in our model is that other parameter estimates are unaffected by assump-
tion about C, w˜TE and w˜
T
NE. Table 11 lists the targeted moments and shows that our simple
model is able to replicate these quantities exactly, and Appendix F provides further details
on the estimation.
5.3 Results and Interpretation
Structural estimates: Table 12 lists the structural estimates of the model’s parameters.
The value of home production η is higher in non-terror locations, which are more rural, with
a presumably higher involvement of children in household work. The relatively high value
27Returns to schooling in Somalia are 48% of the corresponding magnitude in Kenya.
37
Table 11: Targeted moments and model fit.
Data Std.err. Model
Fraction enrolled in non-terror region 48.69% (0.014) 48.69%
Fraction enrolled in terror region 63.00% (0.014) 63.00%
Fraction of children working in non-terror region 20.33% (0.011) 20.33%
Fraction of children working in terror region 10.31% (0.009) 10.31%
DiD coefficient for enrolment -8.17% (0.043) -8.17%
DiD coefficient for working -1.15% (0.025) -1.15%
Notes: Terror regions include areas within a 25km radius of a terrorist
attack. The fractions enrolled and working refer to the first round of the
HSNP survey (2010), before the increase in the number of attacks the coun-
ties Madera and Wajir. The Difference-in-difference (DiD) coefficients are
based on the change 2010-2012. Source: Hunger Safety Net Programme
evaluation data.
attributed to staying at home relative to other activity choices reflects the large fraction
(about 30 percent in both types of location) of children who are reported to neither attend
school nor work for a wage outside the house. Possibly, many of these children perform
essential duties such as looking after younger siblings. The perceived probability pi of a
child dying in a terrorist attack exceeds the objective probability 2 · 10−5 by about a factor
7.5. This discrepancy is in line with directly elicited subjective expectations suggesting
that individuals tend to strongly over-estimate mortality risk (see e.g. Fischhoff et al., 2000;
Delavande et al., 2017). As explained above, we estimate the perceived probability ψ that the
returns to schooling deteriorate under different assumptions. Our preferred point estimate
is obtained under the scenario that economic conditions including the returns to education
in Kenya become similar to those in neighboring Somalia. We estimate that Kenyan parents
attribute a small, though non-negligible probability of about 0.7 percent to this scenario.
Counterfactual analysis: With these estimates at hand, the model can be used for
out-of-sample predictions and to examine different mechanisms. With an elasticity of school
attendance with respect to a change in the perceived risk of leaving the house of -0.158,
this channel clearly dominates the effect of an expected decrease in the returns to school-
ing (elasticity of -0.009). Figure 8 shows the response in school attendance for a range of
subjective probabilities pi and ψ. Whereas we do not have an objective probability for the
event that parts of Eastern Kenya descend into instability, we do observe the objective frac-
tion of Kenyan children dying in a terrorist attack. Figure 8a illustrates that the degree to
which agents overestimate the probability of a child dying in a terrorist attack causes a 7.0
percentage point reduction in school attendance.
Finally, we use our simple model for a back of the envelope calculation of the welfare cost
of terrorism over an individual’s life course. At our estimated perceived probabilities, the
discounted life-time loss amounts to 1,488 USD (purchasing power adjusted), corresponding
38
Table 12: Structural parameter estimates.
Parameter Point est. Std. err.
perceived risk of dying, pi 0.015% (< 10−5)
perceived risk of decrease in returns to schooling, ψ (different models):
(I) 10% drop in returns to schooling 1.206% (0.004)
(II) zero returns to schooling 0.351% (0.001)
(III) returns to schooling as in Somalia 0.731% (0.002)
value of home production in non-terror region, ηNT 601.863 (0.371)
value of home production in terror region, ηT 567.281 (0.190)
std. dev. of preferences in non-terror region, σNT 3399.583 (2.729)
std. dev. of preferences in terror region, σT 1370.782 (0.667)
Notes: GMM estimates for the structural model parameters detailed in Sec-
tion 5. The perceived risk of a decrease in the returns to schooling in regions
affected by terrorist attacks, ψ, is estimated under different assumptions: (I)
returns to schooling decrease by 10%, (II) returns to schooling fall to zero,
and (III) returns to schooling fall to the Somali level (drop by 48%). Other
parameter estimates remain unaffected by this assumption. Estimation based
on HSNP (2010-2012) data. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Figure 8: Perceived probabilities and school attendance
Notes: Model simulations based on GMM estimates for the structural model parameters detailed in the
text, using HSNP (2010-2012) data. Panel (a) shows school attendance for varying perceived probabilities of
dying in a terrorist attack, keeping the perceived risk of instability at its estimated value. Panel (b) shows
school attendance for varying perceived probabilities of instability, keeping the perceived risk of dying in a
terrorist attack at its estimated value.
to about 1.6 times the average annual earnings of an adult without any schooling in a location
experiencing terrorist attacks. Figure 9 shows how this value varies for different probabilities.
The right panel of the figure further shows that even if instability is no concern (ψ = 0),
the welfare loss barely decreases, as agents are still concerned about the immediate danger
of being killed in an attack. Instead, if the latter is eliminated (pi = 0), the estimated
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perceived risk of instability (ψ = 0.73%) alone only induces a relatively small expected (and
discounted) welfare loss of 61 USD.
Figure 9: Perceived probabilities and welfare loss
Notes: Model simulations based on GMM estimates for the structural model parameters detailed in the
text, using HSNP (2010-2012) data. Panel (a) shows the change in life-time utility for varying perceived
probabilities of dying in a terrorist attack, keeping the perceived risk of instability at its estimated value.
Panel (b) shows the change in life-time utility for varying perceived probabilities of instability, keeping the
perceived risk of dying in a terrorist attack at its estimated value.
6 Conclusion
Besides a potential direct physical impact on school infrastructure or personnel that terrorist
attacks share with other forms of violence, we show that indirect mechanisms like changes in
expectations contribute significantly to the reduction in primary school enrolment of Kenyan
children. In particular, terrorist attacks not occurring on a child’s way to school, and even in
a separate administrative area, have an effect, conditional on attacks occurring closer to the
child. For these attacks, we can rule out any direct physical impact. Similarly, the salience
of terrorism, as measured by threats and media reporting, reduces school enrolment above
and beyond the effect of attacks carried out. Whereas we do not observe any correlation of
attacks with self-reported experiences of violence, the correlation with concerns about vio-
lence is large. Based on this evidence, we structurally estimate a behavioural model in which
terrorist attacks may alter agents’ expectations about the costs and benefits of schooling.
Our estimation suggests that the perceived risk of dying in a terrorist attack substantially
exceeds the objective rate, resulting in an inefficiently low level of school attendance. Our
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back of the envelope calculations, furthermore, suggest that exposure to terrorism results in
significant lifetime losses in welfare.
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Appendices - for online publication
A Additional maps
(a) Kenya’s administrative areas (b) Yemen - Natural gas and terrorism
(c) HSNP clusters and terrorist attacks (d) HSNP - Treated and control clusters
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(e) DHS respondents (f) Primary schools in Kenya
(g) East of Kenya
Notes: Map a: shows Kenya’s 8 regions and 47 counties, Map b: show’s Yemen’s gas and petrol pipelines and
AQAP controlled areas, Map c: shows municipalities interviewed under HSNP, Map d: shows municipalities
interviewed under HSNP by terror status (red=attacks, yellow=experienced terror, green=did not experience
terror), Map e: shows the geographical coordinates of respondents for the DHS 2009 and 2014, Map f: shows
the geographical coordinates all 31,231 primary schools in Kenya, Map g: shows 3 most eastern regions of
Kenya (East of Kenya).
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B Temporal and geographical variation
2009 2010
2011 2012
2013 2014
Notes: Maps show location of terrorist attacks in Kenya between 2009 and 2014, radii indicate number
of casualties, red circles denote attacks by al-Shabaab, blue circles attacks that cannot be attributed to a
particular perpetrator.
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C Distance to the border
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Means
Number of Percent
terrorist attacks explained
One over distance 5,003.8*** 5,374.7*** 64.5% 0.032
(660.9) (831.3)
Population in 2014 3.7 5.6% 0.91
(6.7)
Change in population 2009 to 2014 43.2 7.9% 0.11
(29.1)
Land area 31.4 4.3% 0.01
(149.6)
Per capita govt revenues 66.4 14.7% 0.01
(1,075.5)
Per capita govt expenditures 89.9 3.1% 0.004
(1,315.0)
Counties 47 47 47
R squared 0.560 0.691
Notes: The table reports parameter estimates and means for terrorist attacks and county characteristics;
covariates are defined as follows, one over distance: is one divided by the distance between a county’s centroid
and the nearest point of the border between Somalia and Kenya, Population in 2014: population of county
in year 2014, Change in population 2009 to 2014: population of county in year 2014 minus population of
county in year 2009, Land area: area covered by county, Per capita govt revenues: county revenues in 2014
divided by population of county in year 2014, Per capita govt expenditures: county expenditures in 2014
divided by population of county in year 2014.
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D Effect of terrorism on school enrolment: Separate
IV estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: percentage of children in school by age 6
Means 65.5 69.6
Terrorist attacks −1.299∗∗∗ −1.318∗∗∗ −1.213∗∗∗ −1.529∗∗∗ −1.038∗∗∗ −1.050∗∗∗ −0.947∗∗∗ −1.271∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.254) (0.266) (0.245) (0.165) (0.158) (0.161) (0.176)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
indiv. charact. YES YES YES YES
F-statistic 37.4 21.3 13.3 28.6 16.3 42.3 47.6 34.0
Instrument All AQAP Gas Coal All AQAP Gas Coal
R squared 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.776 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.228
Unit of observation county individual
Observations 658 40,657
Notes: The table reports the effect of terrorist attacks on school enrolment; Terrorist attacks is the number
of attacks classified as terrorist per county and year; Columns 1-4: dependent variable is the county average
of children enrolled in school by age 6; data structure is a panel for the 47 counties for the years 2001-
14; column 1 uses 3 instruments: interaction of 1/distance and attacks by AQAP, Yemen’s exports of
hydrocarbons in previous year and coal imports by United Arab Emirates in previous year; column 2 uses
interaction of 1/distance and attacks by AQAP as instrument; column 3 uses interaction of 1/distance and
Yemen’s exports of hydrocarbons in previous year as instrument; column 4 uses interaction of 1/distance
and coal imports by United Arab Emirates in previous year; Columns 5-8: dependent variable takes value
100 if a child is enrolled in school by age 6; data structure is one observation per child; individual controls
include indicators for gender, rural community, electricity at dwelling, radio in household, television in
household; column 5 uses 3 instruments: interaction of 1/distance and attacks by AQAP, Yemen’s exports
of hydrocarbons in previous year and coal imports by United Arab Emirates in previous year; column 6 uses
interaction of 1/distance and attacks by AQAP as instrument; column 7 uses interaction of 1/distance and
Yemen’s exports of hydrocarbons in previous year as instrument; column 8 uses interaction of 1/distance
and coal imports by United Arab Emirates in previous year; data are drawn from 2009 and 2014 Kenyan
DHS; standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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E Effect of terrorism on school enrolment: Robustness
This appendix addresses the concern that terrorist attacks lead the government to change its
expenditure patterns. It could be, for instance, that the central government responds to the
rise in terrorist attacks by increasing expenditure on security. Kenya provides a contingent for
the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), which fights, amongst others, al-Shabaab.
An increased presence of security forces in the border region, in turn, could affect education.
To investigate this, we use information on the government’s expenditure on “Public Order
and Safety” we digitised from official government reports. Any effect of these expenditures
on the whole of Kenya would be picked up by the time effect. To allow for the possibility that
safety expenditure has a particularly strong effect on border regions, we interact the federal
expenditure data with a dummy for the northeast of Kenya and include it as a covariate in
the estimation of equation (2). Column (1) shows that controlling for a differential effect of
safety expenditure in northeastern Kenya hardly changes the coefficient on terrorist attacks.
The parameter estimate is almost identical to the main result in column (1) of table 3. We
also control for education expenditure having a disproportionate effect in the northeast the
same way in column (2). Again, the coefficient on terrorist attacks hardly changes. Finally,
we control for both safety and education expenditure (column 3). As before, the results
remain robust.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variables:
% % Total
of children in of women popu-
school by age 6 migrating lation
Means 65.5 3.44 785.68
Terrorist attacks −0.866∗∗∗ −0.824∗∗∗ −0.761∗∗∗ 0.0176 1.689
(0.200) (0.199) (0.208) (0.0570) (6.359)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.780 0.780 0.781 0.016 0.974
Safety spening × NE YES YES
Education spening × NE YES YES
Observations 658 14,731 658
Notes: The table reports the effect of terrorist attacks on migration and school enrolment; Terrorist attacks
is the number of attacks classified as terrorist per county and year; data structure is a panel for the 47 counties
for the years 2001-14; dependent variable is the county average of children enrolled in school by age 6; column
1 controls for percentage of government spending used for safety interacted with dummy for northeastern
Kenya (Mandera, Wajir and Garissa); column 2 controls for percentage of government spending used for
education interacted with dummy for northeastern Kenya (Mandera, Wajir and Garissa); column 3 controls
for both interactions; column 4 has dependent variable = 100 if woman reports having moved to current
residence in year t data drawn from 2014 round of DHS; column 5 has as dependent variable the total
population per county and year, data drawn from Kenyan Bureau of Statistics (KStat); all standard errors
are clustered at county level.
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To examine the robustness of the estimates provided in Table 3, in this appendix we also
show OLS and IV estimates for different sub-samples. Specifically, we exclude the largest
cities Nairobi and Mombasa from the sample; we only use the years 2009-14 for which school
enrolment rates can be constructed from the 2014 round of the DHS, i.e. without using the
data from different waves; and allow for a separate time trend for northeastern Kenya (the
counties Mandera, Wajir and Garissa).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: percentage of children in school by age 6
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Means 64.5 76.6 65.5
Terrorist attacks −0.813∗∗∗ −1.318∗∗∗ −0.388 −0.615∗∗∗ −0.640 ∗ ∗ −1.142∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.260) (0.238) (0.217) (0.245) (0.421)
c and t effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
F-statistic 38.6 34.7 10.5
R squared 0.785 0.782 0.896 0.895 0.781 0.780
excl. Nairobi & Mombasa 2009-14 only separate time trends
Observations 630 238 658
Notes: The table reports the effect of terrorist attacks on school enrolment; Terrorist attacks is the number
of attacks classified as terrorist per county and year; dependent variable is the county average of children
enrolled in school by age 6; data structure is a panel for the 47 counties for the years 2001-14; columns 2, 4
and 6 use 3 instruments: interaction of 1/distance and attacks by AQAP, Yemen’s exports of hydrocarbons
in previous year and coal imports by United Arab Emirates in previous year; data are drawn from 2009
and 2014 Kenyan DHS; standard errors are clustered at county level; Columns 1-2: exclude Nairobi and
Mombasa; Columns 3-4: only use years 2009-14 drawn from 2014 DHS; Columns 5-6: include a linear time
trend specific for the three Northeastern counties (Mandera, Wajir and Garissa).
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F Identification in the structural model
We estimate the structural parameter vector θ = (pi, ψ, ηNT , ηT , σNT , σT )
′ of the behavioural model in
Section 5 by GMM, minimizing the distance between theoretical moments mt implied by the model and the
corresponding data moments md from the HSNP sample. Specifically, we minimize the estimation criterion
crit(θ) = (md −mt(θ))
′
W (md −mt(θ)) ,
where W is a weighting matrix with the inverse empirical variances on the diagonal.
To illustrate the informativeness of the moments we use for the parameters that we seek to identify,
Figure 10 plots the criterion against different values of the structural parameters. For each parameter, the
criterion obtains a clear local minimum.
Figure 10: Local minima of the criterion with respect to values of structural parameters.
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